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Paul Krugman once noted that it is not remarkable that people tend to favor structural 
interpretations for economic problems. Losing one's job or seeing one's wealth fall by a factor 
of two or three is often a tragedy for workers and their families. It is an anathema that this might 
be the result of some bureaucrat accidentally miscalculating the money supply in one's own 
country or, even worse, in some other country. How can such pain be caused by something so 
trivial as misreading information about monetary aggregates? Yet, these are exactly the 
explanations that economic theory suggests are critical in understanding business cycles. Hence 
it is not surprising that in all countries there is a tendency to give business cycles a structural 
interpretation. 
Consider, for example, the first Japanese macroeconomic crisis for which detailed data 
exist. Between 1876 and 1880, Japan began the process of developing a modern banking sector. 
As in the 1980's, the liberalization of finance had unintended monetary consequences. Namely, 
money supply grew due to the very rapid increase in circulation of private bank notes. Hence, 
while government paper money grew by about 4% per year over this time period, the total 
money supply, comprised of government and national bank notes, grew at an annual rate of 11% 
(Rosovsky, p. 128). This rapid expansion in the money supply was coupled with a dramatic fall 
in taxes which were based in part on the nominal value of land. Government tax revenue as a 
share of net domestic product fell by almost a factor of two. This combined fiscal and monetary 
stimulus led to substantial overheating of the Japanese economy. Between 1878 and 1880, 
Ohkawa (1958) estimates that Japanese per capita real income grew at the astonishing annual 
rate of 18% (p. 340). 
In 1881, the Japanese Minister of Finance, Matsukata Masayoshi, cut the money supply 
dramatically. This had the predictable effect of causing a dramatic contraction in the economy. 
Japanese taxes as a share of NDP also rose sharply largely eliminating the benefits to taxpayers 
that had accrued in the earlier period. As a result of this, Japanese real per capita income growth 
went sharply negative: averaging around minus 7% for the first two years of Matsukata's term. 
This, coupled with a worldwide slump in the early 1880's, meant that income did not return to its 
1880 level until 1885. 
As one might expect from such a contraction, there was considerable hardship for both 
financial and non-financial firms. As Rosovsky notes, the number of joint stock companies fell 
by over half. Moreover, the impact on the financial sector was also severe. Eight per cent of 
Japan's banks had failed by 1884. While deposits in Japanese banks rose by 35% between 1881 
and 1885, lending fell by 18% over the same time period. Japan was experiencing a credit 
crunch. 
It is interesting to note how western observers reacted to the crisis at the time. Allen 
(1946, p.41) provides two quotes from the leading English language newspaper in Japan at the 
time, the Japan Gazette, 
"Wealthy we do not think Japan will ever become: the advantages 
conferred by nature, with the exception of climate forbid it." 1881 
"The national banking system of Japan is but another example of the 
futility of trying to transfer Western growth to an Oriental habitat. In this part of 
the world principles, established and recognized in the West, appear to tend 
fatally towards weediness and corruption." 1882 
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Many authors have used quotes such as these as evidence of the short sightedness of foreigners 
observing the Japanese system. Certainly it is fair to say that very few people predicted the 
eventual rise of Japan over the next century. However, one should also bear in mind how 
difficult it is to predict the future. How many of us could accurately predict which country is 
likely to have the world's highest per capita income in one hundred years? 
For the purposes of this paper, however, what is most striking about these quotes is not 
how badly observers in the 1880's predicted the 1980's, but rather how badly they understood 
what was happening in the 1880's. It was absolutely obvious that the crisis in the 1880's was 
macroeconomic, not structural, but the interpretations seem oddly preoccupied with structural 
features of the Japanese economy. Certainly, the failure of many banks was due to the fact that 
they were mismanaged, but given that the Japanese price level fell by 25% between 1881 and 
1884, there is little doubt that many banks ran into difficulty because they simply failed to 
predict inflation accurately. 
Indeed, by trying to explain macroeconomic shocks with structural explanations, not only 
did contemporary analysts miss the true explanation of what was happening, they also 
misunderstood the important structural changes that were taking place. The really big story in 
the 1870's and 1880's was the very successful creation of the banking system, stock market, 
educational system, and governmental structure that were to be the foundation of future Japanese 
economic growth. With perhaps the exception of the banking system, these institutions were 
only tangentially related to the short-term macroeconomic performance of Japan. But it was 
hard for contemporary observers to separate Japan's impressive attempts to adopt foreign 
knowledge and institutions from their contemporaneous growth rates. 
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Of course the major question we are faced with today is to what extent the current 
Japanese recession reflects structural factors and to what extent is it simply a macroeconomic 
phenomenon. We are certainly not immune from conflating the two explanations. It now seems 
fairly clear that an overvalued dollar and an over-expansionary monetary policy contributed to 
very rapid Japanese growth in the 1980's. However, when the yen was trading at 250 to the 
dollar, the success of Japan was often attributed to industrial policy, just-in-time delivery, 
permanent employment, and a host of cultural characteristics. Today, America's resurgence is 
popularly attributed to restructuring. However, it is also obvious that the yen's movement from 
an average level of 239 to the dollar in 1985 to 94 in 1995 probably has something to do with the 
difficulties that US producers faced at the beginning of the period relative to now. 
What is quite surprising, in retrospect, is how hard it was for people to see how important 
the macroeconomic phenomena were even in the 1980's. It was not uncommon to observe 
contemporary observers writing statements that now seem strangely at odds with the present. 
Authors such as Clyde Prestowitz in Trading Places (1988) claimed that "Few, if any, American 
companies can compete with the Japanese in areas the latter deem important." Because of this, 
Prestowitz argued the US and Japan would "trade places." In some sense, Prestowitz was right. 
In the 1980's, the US was a troubled economy while Japan was seen as the model to emulate. 
Today, the reverse is true. Japan and the US have traded places, although not in the way 
Prestowitz imagined. 
One of the major problems with trying to explain economic performance with structural 
explanations is that structural features of an economy change very slowly. Structural features of 
economies may be very important in understanding long-run phenomena, but they are probably 
less important in understanding short-run patterns. If one wants to explain short-run growth 
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patterns by focusing on structural features, one must be prepared to rapidly adjust what one 
considers to be strengths and weaknesses. Fortunately, we seem to have a tremendous capacity 
for "double-think." As Eugene Dattel (1993) has pointed out, the very same features that were 
seen as tremendous Japanese assets are now seen as liabilities. For example, in 1987 Business 
Week wrote, 
"As American Business has ample reason to know, when the Japanese home in on 
a new market, they aim at the bull's eye. In three short years, guided by strategic 
planning that subordinates quick profits to long-term market growth, four major 
Japanese firms, Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, and Yamaichi, are well on their way to 
becoming major players in US financial markets." [September 7, p. 122] 
Of course, Yamaichi is now bankrupt and the other three firms are struggling for their survival. 
Within three short years The Economist would conclude, "Japanese financial institutions border 
on the primitive" (December 8, 1990, p. 3). If The Economist is right, one must question how 
these primitive institutions convinced the world they were guided by "strategic planning." 
Or consider views of Japan's bureaucracy. In 1995, Chalmers Johnson, long a proponent 
of the ability of the Japanese bureaucracy to guide the economy successfully, wrote, 
"The US must either begin to compete with Japan or go the way of the USSR.... 
Even if they must ignore or fire some academic economists, Americans can no 
longer ignore the view that 'countries that try to promote higher value, higher-
tech industries will eventually have more of them than countries that don't.'" 
Three years later the Wall Street Journal opined in an editorial, "Japanese officialdom seems 
especially clueless" (4/16/98). Were Japanese bureaucrats ever prescient or clueless or do these 
gyrations in opinion reflect the difficulty of attributing macroeconomic shocks to structural 
features? The point is not that the first set of observers was wrong and the second set right. 
Rather, economies change much more rapidly than their institutions, so one should be cautious 
about attributing any short-run phenomenon, be it good or bad, to structural features. 
5 
With perfect hindsight, it appears clear that a major problem with our interpretation of the 
1980's was that there was some confusion between macroeconomics and structural 
interpretations of the Japanese economy. A relevant question is whether at least some of our 
current pessimism about Japan isn't also conflating some of the two factors. 
Consider the current crisis. Between 1989 and 1997, real per capita GDP grew at an 
annual rate of only 1.4 per cent. This crisis has been widely characterized as the worst postwar 
economic crisis that Japan has faced. This is somewhat misleading. Japan started the postwar 
period in 1946 with a per capita GDP level that was approximately the same as thirty years 
earlier. As Ito (1996) and others have shown, the first twenty or so years of Japanese postwar 
development represented a period of catching up to the trends established in the prewar period. 
Since Japan spent much of this time period returning to the prewar growth path, it is not 
surprising that its growth rate was relatively fast until it returned to its path in 1963. 
What is more puzzling is why Japan's real per capita GDP grew at an average rate of 
8.5% between 1963 and 1973. One important factor to bear in mind is that Japan's good 
performance was not unique. Over the same time period real per capita US GDP expanded at an 
average rate of 2.9%. This period marks a time of remarkable expansion for the US economy. 
Between 1938 and 1960, real per capita GDP grew at an average rate of 3.4% [Maddison (1982)] 
as opposed to only 1.9% between 1900 and 1938. 
This trend acceleration in the US is relevant because a major determinate of Japanese 
growth is technological catch-up. The prewar Japanese growth rates of 2.9% were sufficient to 
generate convergence with a much slower growing US. If Japanese growth rates had just 
returned to the level of GDP predicted by its prewar trend and then continued at that growth rate, 
the US and Japan would have diverged between 1938 and 1973. Because the 1963 per capita 
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GDP level was only 37% of the that in the US, Japan would have had to have grown at a 6.4% 
per capita rate just to converge to 50% of the US level by 1973. 
Other authors have looked at this more formally. Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1989) 
plot annual GDP per work-hour growth rates and initial GDP per work-hour for 16 industrialized 
between 1950 and 1979. Convergence theory suggests that there should be a negative 
relationship between these variables. Their analysis suggests there is. The Japanese point lies 
almost exactly on the fitted line; there is simply nothing distinctive about Japanese growth rates 
relative to the rest of the OECD over this period. While there are interesting questions 
surrounding why Japan did better than many African, South Asian, and Latin American 
economies, Japan's long-run performance relative to the OECD is not a puzzle. More to the 
point, given the forces of convergence at work, it is not surprising that Japan did not experience 
any prolonged recession in the first thirty years of the postwar period. 
Japan's short-run recent experience is more complex, however. Japan's first major 
postwar recession followed the first oil shock, when the Japanese real GDP growth rate suddenly 
fell from 8% in 1973 to - 1 % in 1974. The recovery was slow and painful; between 1973 and 
1978, the Japanese real per capita GDP growth averaged only 2.1%. This is not much faster than 
the 1.9% rate recorded between 1989 and 1994. Certainly considering that Japan was relatively 
a much poorer country in 1973 than in 1989 and hence should have grown much faster, the 
performance over these two time periods is actually quite comparable. 
It is often argued that part of the reason for the poor performance in this period was that 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) conflated structural and macroeconomic problems.1 Following the first 
oil shock, the BOJ decided to target its policy at eliminating the inflationary aspects of the oil 
shock rather than treating the rise in energy prices as a negative supply shock. The growth rate 
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of M2 + CD's fell from an average of over 20% per year for the three years before 1973 to 11.9% 
per year in 1974. The tighter monetary policy had the desired effect of reducing inflation but at 
the cost of a major recession. 
While the Japanese economy performed comparably in the first five years following the 
first oil shock and the first five years following the bursting of the bubble, the performance over 
the next five years was quite different. The early 1980's mark a period in which the dollar 
became substantially overvalued relative to the yen. Because the BOJ learned from it's mistake 
after the first oil shock, when the second one hit, the BOJ did not raise rates. By contrast, a tight 
money policy in the US caused interest rates to rise substantially, leading to a dramatic 
appreciation of the dollar against the yen in the early 1980's. 
As the dollar fluctuated between 210 to 249, Japanese exports surged (see Figure 1). 
Between 1978 and 1981, the volume of Japanese exports rose by 30% and import volumes 
remained virtually unchanged. By 1985, the volume of Japanese exports had risen by 69% while 
imports had only risen by 16%. This dramatic rise in exports helped speed Japan's recovery and 
generated tremendous frictions with Japan's trading partners. 
The macroeconomic picture following the recent bubble stands in sharp contrast to what 
we have seen in the early 1980's. The tight money policy pursued by the BOJ, even in the face 
of the East Asian crisis, has contributed to a tremendous appreciation. The strong yen explains 
why export volumes rose by 16% between 1993 and 1997, but import volumes rose by 36%. 
While monetary policy helped Japan export its way out of the first crisis, this has not happened 
in the current crisis. 
The notion that the cause of Japan's current ills are fundamentally macroeconomic is 
bolstered by the fact that the Japanese economy does seem to respond to standard 
1 1 am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting I pursue this line of argumentation. 
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macroeconomic stimuli. For example, in 1996 a temporary tax cut caused the Japanese real per 
capita GDP to grow at 3.6%. This was faster than any other country in the G7 and led the 
government to raise taxes in the belief that the worst was behind them. It is an open question 
whether this would have been the right decision had the East Asian crisis not struck in 1997. 
However, given the good fortune of the having the dollar overvalued in the 1980's and the 
misfortune of having the current Asian crisis strike just as Japan was getting back on its feet, one 
should not underestimate the role played by bad luck. 
Today's long-term economic crisis are not without precedent. The historical record 
suggests that there have been numerous occasions in which Japan stagnated for relatively long 
time periods. The prewar period produced many such slumps punctuated by remarkable periods 
of growth. According to the Long Term Economic Statistics [Ohkawa (1974)], Japan's real per 
capita income growth rate averaged 2.1% between 1885 and 1940. This is comparable to the 
2.7% real per capita GDP growth rate that the Japanese economy recorded between 1973 and 
1996. What is perhaps most surprising is that despite the slightly more rapid overall prewar 
growth rate, the earlier period was punctuated by many recessionary or slow growth periods. For 
example, before the second world war there were two long periods (1895-1914, 1919-1932) in 
which per capita income growth rates averaged under 0.6%. By this standard, the recent 
recession would not even count. In other words, with the exception of the immediate postwar 
experience, recessions and periods of relative stagnation have always been a feature of Japanese 
economic development. These slow growth periods account for about one third of the prewar 
economic period. 
Structural Impediments to Growth 
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Our previous emphasis on macroeconomic phenomena does not mean that structural 
features are unimportant. One can identify a number of ways in which structural characteristics 
have affected the current situation in Japan. First, few people would deny that the mountain of 
bad debt held by Japanese financial institutions constitutes a severe structural problem. The 
insolvency of the financial sector may spill over into other sectors as well. Indeed, Peek and 
Rosengren (1997) present persuasive evidence that Japan is experiencing a credit crunch arising 
from the unwillingness of Japanese banks to lend money. Obviously the resolution of this 
banking crisis is something that is of paramount importance for Japanese economic prosperity. 
While the insolvency of the financial sector may be seen as a structural problem, banking 
crises that arise from severe asset deflations are not unique to the Japanese economic system. In 
the 1930's and 1980's, the US also had banking crises that had real economic effects. Other 
countries whose land and stock prices have risen and fallen dramatically have also experienced 
similar crises. Given that Japanese stock prices fell by a factor of three from their peek and 
urban land prices fell by as much as 70%, it is not surprising that Japanese financial institutions 
found themselves saddled with large amounts of bad debt. I therefore would like to consider the 
banking crisis, per se, part of the macroeconomic explanation. 
Posen (1998) has forcefully argued that beyond the banking crisis, it is safe for 
policymakers to ignore structural issues as a means of pulling Japan out of the recession. Posen 
cites an OECD (1998) study that found that structural reform would not raise Japanese GDP by 
more than 5.6%. This number is quite small compared to potential macroeconomic gains from 
pulling out of the current recession. 
10 
One of the problems with this argument is that the gains from structural reform are likely 
to be much larger than those suggested by the OECD. Moreover, structural reform may be a 
necessary complement to the macroeconomic policy. There are several reasons why one might 
believe that structural reform is more important than the OECD suggest. First, the substantial 
deregulation that has already occurred in the 1990's was not counted toward the potential gains, 
only future reforms were considered. This works to push down the impact. Second, financial 
market, insurance, and construction deregulation was not allowed to have any impact in the 
calculation of Japan's number even though these are precisely the areas that are often seen as 
most important in the reform effort. Third, the OECD assumed that the impact of deregulation 
on productivity was 6% or less in four of the five sectors that they examined. As I shall argue 
shortly, this number seems far too small. 
More importantly, in reviewing the causes of the bubble, it seems hard to argue that one 
can divorce Japan's current dilemma from its structural problems. While it probably was the 
case that the BOJ pursued an overly expansionary monetary policy during the late 1980's, it is 
important to ask why. The first thing to recognize is that this was not a simple policy mistake 
but was deeply linked to the Japanese government's recalcitrance about structural reform. 
As Miller and Milhaupt (1997) have documented, deregulation of the foreign bond 
market coupled with widespread interest rate regulation in other sectors caused Japan's heavily 
regulated financial system to pump large amounts of money into real estate investment. 
Similarly, the liberalization of the domestic bond market in the 1980's fundamentally changed 
the relationships between monetary policy and monetary aggregates. Had Japan not opened its 
markets to international capital flows and had Japan's regulatory system not forced certain 
investors to hold real estate, it is unlikely that the BOJ would have misjudged money supply 
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growth. Indeed, the linkages to BOJ policy were sufficiently murky that even economists 
interested in the reasons behind the asset inflation at the time did not see BOJ policy as central. 
For example, French and Poterba (1990) wrote a paper entitled, "Are Japanese Stock Prices Too 
High?" that sought to explore the reasons for the rise in Japanese stock prices. Interestingly, 
they made no mention of BOJ policy. Even after the crash, when the paper appeared a year later 
[French and Poterba (1991)] with the new title, "Were Japanese Stock Prices Too High?" 
monetary policy was still not seen as the culprit.2 
While this does not prove that monetary policy was unimportant, it certainly was not 
obvious to extremely insightful economists that this was the principle explanation of what was 
happening in Japan. Indeed, the argument that what happened in Japan was purely driven by 
macroeconomic policy is not as airtight as some would suggest. In order to believe that the BOJ 
caused the bubble to burst by raising interest rates in 1989, one must also believe that the central 
bank could control long-run interest rates. This is often seen as beyond the purview of central 
banks. Indeed, when Ueda (1990) tested whether stock prices were being driven by interest 
rates, he rejected the hypothesis. Hence, it is not unreasonable to question whether there were 
other factors involved. 
There is good reason to believe structural reform is intimately linked with the current 
crisis. Financial liberalization probably helped cause the money supply expand faster than the 
BOJ had expected. While raising interest rates may have slowed the economy, it is not at all 
clear that BOJ policy was the sole cause for the tremendous asset inflation and deflation. 
Macroeconomic policy mattered a lot but so did other policy. Much of Japan's problem during 
the 1980's and 1990's arose from the fundamental inconsistency of having returns demanded by 
the market differ from those being set by the government. Fundamentally, it was incompatible 
21 am indebted to Anil Kashyap for making this point about French and Poterba's paper. 
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for Japan to allow firms to move capital freely in and out of the country while maintaining a 
system whereby some institutions were paying above market returns and others were paying 
below market returns. Structural reform in Japanese finance seems to be a necessary condition 
for stable Japanese economic development. 
Of course, structural reform in Japan is occurring in many sectors beyond finance. The 
1990's probably will be seen as a watershed period in Japanese development similar to the 
immediate postwar period. The character of Japanese finance, insurance, telecommunications, 
transportation, and retailing are undergoing dramatic changes. As Saxonhouse (1988) has 
argued, one of the hallmarks of Japanese development has been rapid structural change in 
industries: Japan's ability to reinvent itself. The rapid rise and fall of industries has placed 
considerable pressure on foreign countries that held seemingly insurmountable leads. The real 
question for the future is whether the Japanese are going to be able to do in finance, 
telecommunications, insurance, and other non-tradables what they did in cars, electronics, steel, 
and semiconductors. 
Japan's accomplishments in manufacturing are even more surprising given the 
widespread pessimism about Japan following the Second World War. Japan started this period 
with much of the country in ruins, and it was very hard for contemporary scholars to see how 
Japan could adjust to a non-militarized, non-colonial future. For example, as late as 1950, the 
eminent scholar Edwin O. Reischauer saw many reasons for pessimism, writing, 
"It is unlikely that Japan can recover economically without the restoration of trade 
with Northern Korea, Manchuria, and China proper. And yet it is not difficult to 
visualize the continuation of the present situation in which trade with these 
regions is all but nonexistent.... Even if Japan should be able to restore normal 
trade with the rest of the world, it is still not certain that she can reestablish a 
viable economy.... Add to this situation the heavy cost of rebuilding her cities 
and reconstructing her damaged and disrupted industries and the resulting picture 
is one of almost unrelieved gloom, [p. 298-9] 
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Despite these problems, Japan was able to make the necessary structural adjustments and grew at 
8% per year over the next decade. The fact that Japan's future success has never been obvious to 
contemporary observers should temper our characterizations of Japanese firms as "primitive." 
On the one hand, it is hard to see Japan catching up to the US in finance. On the other hand, it 
was hard to see Japan catching up the US in automobiles too. 
While it impossible to predict the future, we can make some headway into understanding 
what is at stake in Japanese structural reforms. To do this we shall focus on two issues. The first 
is whether there is evidence of large-scale inefficiency in some or all of the Japanese economy. 
The second is whether there is evidence that Japanese government policy may have insulated 
firms from competition and therefore nurtured inefficient industries. If all the stories about 
relative Japanese inefficiencies are correct, then these should have a counterpart in terms of 
productivity. Fortunately Jorgenson and Kuroda (1990) have painstakingly put together a data 
set that matches productivity levels in Japan and the US for 28 sectors comprising all elements of 
each economy. Jorgenson and Kuroda used 1970 purchasing price parities to calibrate industry 
total factor productivity (TFP) and then calculated TFP growth rates that account for capital, 
energy, materials, labor, and labor quality growth. These data are the most carefully constructed 
series for international comparisons. 
An unfortunate feature of the Jorgenson and Kuroda data is that the series only go until 
1985. This makes it impossible to use these series for understanding more recent trends. 
Therefore, I have updated these series by using TFP indices generated by the OECD. The 
OECD's International Sectoral Database contains compatible information on TFP in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors for 10 OECD countries. 
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The data quality of the OECD numbers is lower than that of the Jorgenson and Kuroda 
numbers for several reasons. First, rather than basing the TFP numbers on output, they are based 
on value added. Second, the only inputs that are used in the calculation are aggregate labor and 
capital. This means that the TFP numbers are going to be an amalgam of productivity due to 
TFP and improvement in the quality of inputs. However, because most of the increase in 
educational attainment in Japan and US occurred prior to 1985, these problems are probably not 
severe in the more recent data. 
Jorgenson and Kuroda have already noted that there is only limited evidence in favor of 
productivity convergence. In this section we begin by repeating the Jorgenson and Kuroda 
exercise by aggregating the TFP indices. The results from this exercise are plotted in Figure 2. 
Not surprisingly, data reveal a very similar pattern as that reported in Jorgenson and Kuroda. 
Overall there is no evidence of convergence in aggregate productivity between Japan and the US. 
Figure 2 also presents evidence on relative productivity in manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors. When we examine these series an interesting pattern emerges. Between 1960 and 1980 
Japanese TFP in manufacturing rose from being only 79% of the US level to 94% and persisted 
at this level for over a decade.3 
Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) have investigated some of the determinants of this 
technological catch up between Japan and the US more formally. The data reveal that 
manufacturing industries in Japan that were farther behind tended to catch-up more quickly after 
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It is interesting to note that the relative catch-up in manufacturing persisted until 1991 when there was 
dramatic divergence. Between 1991 and 1993 Japanese productivity in manufacturing fell from 93% of the US level 
to 81%. This very recent divergence arises in part because of the procyclicality of measured productivity. With the 
US coming out of a recession, measured productivity rose in the US by 7% over this time period while productivity 
in Japan fell by a similar margin. To some extent this probably reflects the fact that employment and capital stock 
numbers move relatively slowly compared with output and prices. This tends to cause productivity to rise during 
booms and fall during busts, and makes it relatively easy to conflate structural and macroeconomic problems. 
Permanent employment makes Japanese firms seem less productive during recessions when output is low and 
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controlling for a number of industry characteristics. In other words, there is evidence of 
convergence in manufacturing. Moreover, we find no evidence that sectors that exported more 
intensively grew faster. On the contrary, we find that higher levels of import intensity are 
associated with more rapid technological convergence. In other words, those advocating 
"export-led growth" have it exactly backwards. It is imports that matter. 
Lawrence and Weinstein argue that the principle mechanism through which imports have 
historically raised productivity in Japan is by inducing higher levels of competition. Japanese 
firms may not like to compete with foreigners in their domestic market, but the evidence 
suggests that the competition makes them better firms. In other words, the main message from 
the Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) work is that liberalization to foreign competition is an 
important conduit for growth in manufactures. Since one can easily think of similar channels 
operating in non-manufacturing sectors, it is reasonable to conjecture that the absence of 
significant foreign competition in Japanese non-manufacturing sectors may have important 
productivity consequences. Likewise efforts to liberalize these sectors today may raise future 
productivity. 
If the data tell us overall productivity did not converge but manufacturing productivity 
did, then the reason for the lack of convergence must be divergence in the non-manufacturing 
sectors. This is exactly what we see in Figure 2. Between 1960 and 1985 the relative gap in 
productivity in non-manufacturing sectors actually increased by 11%. The cause of this was 
stagnation of productivity growth in the Japanese services sector. Between 1960 and 1985, 
aggregate TFP in manufacturing rose by 29% and in Japan as a whole by 11%. By contrast in 
non-manufacturing sectors, it only rose by only 3%. This is quite different from the US 
employment high and more productive during booms when the reverse is true. Furthermore, it is also possible that 
some of this decline reflects real economic costs for manufacturers as a result of the banking crisis in Japan. 
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experience in which productivity growth in manufacturing and non-manufacturing rose by 18 
and 15 per cent, respectively. 
This failure to obtain convergence evenly across Japanese sectors helps explain an 
important phenomenon regarding the price level in Japan and is clear evidence of the well-
known Balassa-Samuelson effect. Purchasing power parity between Japan and the US has long 
been seen as out of line with the exchange rate.4 The TFP evidence suggests a reason. The 
exchange rate is determined in part by equilibrating the prices of tradables across countries. The 
convergence in TFP in manufacturing meant that tradables prices tended to be quite similar in 
Japan and the US. However, the lower productivity in Japanese non-manufacturing sectors 
meant that the prices of non-tradables in Japan were significantly higher than in other countries. 
While this is not the only explanation for why prices in Japan have tended to be so high, the 
magnitudes suggested by this analysis are impressive. If the exchange rate were set at a rate in 
1985 that equilibrated the prices of Japanese and US goods, then this implies that the prices of 
non-tradables in Japan should have been 35% higher than non-tradables in the US.5 This 
certainly helped contribute to the notion that something was quite different about the structure of 
the Japanese economy. 
A second important result from these data underscores the importance of measurement in 
doing international TFP comparisons. The Jorgenson and Kuroda study represents the most 
careful international comparison of TFP levels in the literature. In fact, the data requirements 
were so stringent that no other countries have ever been compared in as careful a manner. This 
raises the question of whether careful measurement matters. At least for Japan and the US, the 
answer appears to be yes. Bernard and Jones (1996) and Ito (1996) use OECD data to examine 
4
 See Marston (1987) for a more detailed discussion and analysis of this point. 
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productivity growth rates in Japan and the US and come up with substantially different results. 
Both of these papers find fairly rapid productivity growth rates in non-traded goods sectors, and 
Bernard and Jones find fairly rapid convergence between Japan and the US in both manufactured 
and non-manufactured goods. The most likely explanation for their results is that by not 
accounting for improving Japanese labor productivity, they overstated the rate of growth of 
Japanese productivity. 
If we take the Jorgenson and Kuroda numbers as accurate, we still have an important 
unanswered question: why has productivity growth been so slow in non-manufacturing sectors. 
Certainly these sectors are measured with the most error. Measuring the output of a bank or a 
consultant is notoriously difficult, and it is possible that our results are in part due to this 
difficulty. However, it still is puzzling why in the US productivity grew at approximately the 
same rate in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, but in Japan, manufacturing did so 
much better than non-manufacturing. While we cannot rule out measurement error, we would 
like to also consider some alternative hypotheses. 
One possible explanation for these different trends is the level of government 
involvement in these sectors. Government intervention in sectors can adversely affect 
productivity growth in a country through two important channels. First, if government 
interventions prop up inefficient industries, that will tend to hold back growth by funneling too 
many of a country's resources into inefficient activities. Second, if government policies are 
misguided they may actually retard efficient investments or innovations within industries. 
Beason and Weinstein (1996) examined targeting by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry and found that Japanese targeting tended to focus on slow growth industries. That 
51 am considering agriculture to be a non-tradable good. Given the high level of protection in Japan during this time 
period, this assumption is not groundless. 
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paper also examined the role of industrial policy in Japanese TFP growth and found little impact. 
A related question is whether the targeting of sectors led to faster convergence between Japan 
and the US. Using the Beason and Weinstein data I calculated correlations between the level of 
targeting as given by the importance of JDB loans, subsidies, tariffs, and taxes to each industry. 
These indexes were then correlated with the growth rate of relative TFP over the period 1960 to 
1985. For every policy measure except net subsidies, there was a negative correlation between 
the degree of assistance and the amount of convergence. This indicates that sectors that 
converged the most were those that tended to have little assistance. 
The one policy that is positively correlated with convergence is net subsidies. However, 
upon closer inspection it appears that this result is driven by two outliers. Processed foods and 
petroleum and coal had extremely negative net subsidy rates and extremely poor performance. 
Indeed the magnitude of their negative net subsidy rates was between four and six times higher 
than that of any other industry in the sample. When we drop these industries from the sample, 
the correlation for the remaining industries is -0.44. This indicates that while there may be some 
evidence that extremely high tax rates may be associated with poor performance, there appears to 
be, in general, either no relationship or a negative relationship between targeting and 
convergence in manufacturing. In other words, both channels of government impact seem 
important. Industrial policy in Japan appears to have increased the size of slow growth sectors 
and impeded their technological convergence. 
It is much more difficult to establish a linkage between government policy in non-
manufacturing sectors because industrial policy in these sectors is often non-transparent and 
quite complex. Rather than try to approach this formally, we take a more casual approach, 
remembering that correlation is not necessarily an indicator of causation. 
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If we look at non-manufacturing sectors there are a few sectors that stand out (see Figure 
2). First, three sectors exhibit either no evidence of convergence or actually diverge: agriculture, 
construction, and transportation and communication. In agriculture, productivity did not only 
fall relative to the US but also in absolute terms within Japan. Despite (or perhaps because of) 
tremendous protection, subsidies, and other policies, Japanese agriculture started out 
approximately even with US agriculture in 1960 but fell to one half the US level by 1985 (see 
Figure 3). This was due to a 47% rise in the productivity of US agriculture coupled with a 26% 
decline in Japanese productivity. In construction, which is another very heavily regulated 
industry, Japanese productivity fell by 24% over this time period. 
Transportation and communication is another example of an industry with radically 
different regulatory histories in Japan and the US (see Figure 4). In the US, deregulation of 
airlines, trucking, telephone, and television was accompanied by extremely rapid growth rates in 
productivity. Productivity growth in transportation and telecommunications in the US was more 
than double that in any other services sector, averaging a whopping 3.4% per year between 1960 
and 1993. In Japan, deregulation has proceeded far more slowly. Productivity growth over the 
same time period was less than half that in the US. It is not hard to understand why regulation of 
airline and trucking pricing and routes and the slow liberalization of telecom may have held back 
productivity growth in Japan. But whatever the cause, the failure of Japan in this realm is 
staggering. In 1960, regulation restrained competition in this industry in both Japan and the US, 
and Japanese productivity in this sector was within 1% of the US level. By 1993, the 
tremendous growth of productivity in the US in this sector caused the Japanese level of 
productivity to fall to only 71% of the US level. 
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These data suggest that there are very serious structural problems in Japan. Very heavily 
regulated and protected sectors seem to perform significantly worse than in the US. Moreover 
we do not see evidence of convergence in these sectors. Japan is behind, and the gap is 
widening. 
Other sectors exhibit more complex patterns. Of particular interest is what has been 
happening in Japanese financial services and real estate. Interestingly, this is a sector that has 
been converging at one of the fastest rates of any sectors in the Japanese economy. However, 
what is interesting about this sector is that its path of convergence has been very uneven. In 
1960, Japanese finance was the most undeveloped sector in the Japanese economy in terms of its 
productivity relative to the US. The Jorgenson and Kuroda data reveal that Japanese financial 
institutions were less than one third as productive as US institutions. 
This may account for some of the early rapid productivity growth in financial services 
and real estate. Between 1960 and 1973, productivity in Japanese finance rose by 4.9% per year. 
By contrast, productivity in non-manufacturing industries as a whole rose only by 0.7% per year 
over this same time period. Hence even by Japanese standards the productivity gains in finance 
were quite impressive. However, between 1973 and 1982, productivity growth in financial 
services stagnated. In fact, there was literally no growth in productivity over the entire decade. 
If we look at other Japanese sectors over the same time period, we find that there was a slight 
decline in productivity for non-manufacturing industries as a whole over this time period and a 
slight increase in manufacturing sectors. If we use the US as the reference point a very similar 
pattern emerges. Between 1960 and 1973, the productivity level of Japanese financial services 
grew from being less than one third that of the US to just over one half. Over the next decade its 
level relative to that of the US hardly rose at all. What might explain this pattern? 
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An obvious candidate is regulation. Over the course of the 1960's and early 1970's the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan became increasingly involved in Japanese financial 
markets. In 1962 Japanese tax law was changed to favor trust banks and insurance companies 
over mutual funds, thereby helping solidify the keiretsu system [see Weinstein (1997) for a more 
complete treatment]. In addition government regulations over portfolio management as well as 
large-scale interventions in the Japanese stock market helped to favor the dominance of banks 
and insurance companies over smaller financial institutions. Between 1960 and 1973, the share 
of equity owned by financial institutions rose from 23.1% to 33.9% as trust banks and insurance 
companies solidified their holdings of other corporations. Over the next twenty years the share 
of financial institution holdings would only rise by another 5.5 percentage points and most of 
that rise occurred before 1980. In other words the financial dominance of financial institutions 
was far more clear in 1973 than in 1960. 
The rise of corporate groups in Japan was paralleled by a rise in regulation. One crude 
measure of the growth of regulation in this industry is the shear number of pages of the MOF's 
banking law. Seiichi Katayama and I have compiled an index of how many pages of banking 
regulations the MOF had on its books. Between 1960 and 1973, MOF banking regulations 
almost doubled from 656 pages to 1297 pages. Over the next 19 years, the number of pages of 
banking regulation only increased by 89 pages. To the extent this is a measure of the degree of 
financial regulation, 1973 marks the finalization of the rules governing Japanese regulation of 
financial services. 
The low rate of TFP growth in finance continued until Japan began serious liberalization 
of its financial markets in the subsequent decade. The watershed event was the revision of the 
Foreign Exchange Control Law in 1980. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that the most 
22 
important factor driving the transformation of the Japanese system was the dramatic 
liberalization of the Japanese bond market 1982. Interestingly, many of these policy changes 
correspond to break points in the TFP data. 
Regardless of whether one believes that regulation was the cause of this slowdown in 
productivity growth in Japanese financial services, the point remains that for approximately one 
decade prior to the beginning of Japanese financial market liberalization, productivity in 
Japanese finance was stagnant. What is equally striking is what has happened to productivity in 
Japanese finance over the period between 1982 and 1994. Despite all of the financial disasters in 
the Japanese finance, insurance, and real estate sectors, productivity growth over this period has 
averaged 0.9% per year. This is faster than comparable rates in the US and faster than 
productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing. In 1993, Japanese finance was almost two-
thirds as productive as finance in the US as opposed to being only half as productive in 1980. 
Hence, there appears to be some concrete evidence that structural reform is occurring in 
Japanese finance and that this sector is beginning to converge with the US. Despite the popular 
notion that Japanese finance is "primitive," there is evidence that over the last two decades 
Japanese finance has become more efficient. Indeed, if these trends persist, Japan will converge 
with the US in finance in 20 years. 
The Future 
The productivity evidence indicates that the productivity gap significantly affects 
Japanese standards of living. This information can be used to obtain estimates of how important 
structural reform is to Japanese standards of living. While we do not have good productivity 
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data for all industries up to 1993, we do have data for industries accounting for approximately 
three quarters of Japanese GDP. Using GDP weights, our estimate for the average TFP level of 
Japan in 1993 is 75% of that of the US. 
In terms of understanding the importance of structural change, we need to address the 
counterfactual of what would happen in Japan if structural change does not occur. A dire 
prediction is that Japan would fall behind other countries, and we may actually observe 
divergence. A more reasonable assumption is that if Japan does nothing its productivity will 
tend to track that of the US, but convergence will not occur. Let's assume that Japanese 
productivity growth in the absence of any structural reforms will equal the rate of US 
productivity growth between 1983 and 1993. This would put predicted Japanese productivity 
growth at about 1% per year. 
Now we can consider how important structural reform is likely to be. Assuming that the 
US represents best practice in all industries, then if Japan were to eliminate all of its structural 
problems, its GDP would rise by 33%. Obviously, this is going to take some time to achieve. 
Many of the reform proposals now being undertaken in Japan are going to take years to phase in 
and progress is undoubtedly going to be slow. Suppose that it takes 20 years for Japan to fully 
liberalize its economy to the level of the US. In this case, the convergence of Japanese 
productivity to US levels would raise Japanese growth rates by 1.5% per year more than they 
would ordinarily be. Given that reasonable estimates for US long-run per capita growth rates 
tend to be in the 2-2.5% range, structural change in Japan may result in Japan outgrowing the US 
by a substantial margin for many years to come. Clearly, a lot is at stake. 
Conclusion 
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We have analyzed the Japanese economic crisis from a macroeconomic and structural 
perspective. Japan's macroeconomic situation, while poor in recent terms, is certainly not 
unprecedented. Historically, Japanese economic development has been quite bumpy and the 
recent postwar experience is exceptional in part due to the devastation caused by the Second 
World War and the exceptional performance of the US economy between 1938 and 1973. There 
are many reasons to believe that much of the poor performance of Japan during the 1990's is due 
to a series of macroeconomic shocks that have buffeted the economy rather than simply a sudden 
collapse of the Japanese system. 
However, the evidence also indicates that large structural problems exist in Japanese non-
traded goods sectors, and these contribute to Japan's woes. Total factor productivity in these 
sectors is considerably below that of the US. Unlike in manufacturing many of these sectors do 
not appear to be approaching US levels of productivity. This exerts a substantial drag on the 
Japanese economy. Japanese finance, after having undergone a period of relative stagnation in 
the 1970's appears to be restructuring quite rapidly and enjoying impressive productivity gains. 
If other sectors perform similarly, Japanese productivity growth may be higher than US growth 
by 1.5% for the next 20 years. This underscores the importance of structural reform in Japan. 
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Figure 1 
Export Volume less Import Volume (Exports and Imports in 1990 set to 100) 
Figure 2 
Japanese Productivity Relative to the US (1960-1993) 
Figure 3 
Productivity Growth in Agriculture in Japan and the US 
Figure 4 
Productivity Growth in Transportation and Communication in Japan and the US 
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